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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

REDWOOD GYM, ALICE'S HEALTH
STUDIO, CINDY'S GOLDEN TOUCH,
GENTLEME~·l 'S QUARTERS, LYNN'S
HEALTH STUDIO, GINGER'S HEALTH
STUDIO, KELLY'S HEALTH STUDIO,
BARBARA'S HEALTH STUDIO'· KIM'S
HEALTH STUDIO, CAVALIER HEALTH
STUDIO, and CONTINENTAL HEALTH
STUDIO,

Appeal No. 16833

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
-v-

SALT LAKE COUNTY COMMISSION,
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY'S
OFFICE, and SALT LAKE COUNTY
SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT,
Defendants-Respondents.

APPELLANTS' PETITION FOR REHEARING AND SUPPORTING BRIEF

PETITIOH FOR REHEARING
Plaintiffs-Appellants (hereinafter "appellants"), by and
through their counsel, hereby petition the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah pursuant to Rule 76(e)(lJ of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure for a rehearing in the above-captioned appeal
based upon the following
grounds:
..

1.

Appellants respectfully submit that the Court should

reconsider its opinion as to appellants' Points IB and II set
forth in appellants' original brief in light of recent legislation
enacted by the Utah State Legislature and signed into law by the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Governor of the State of Utah subsequent to the handing down
of said op inion.
2.

Appellants respectfully submit that the Court should

reconsider its opinion as to appellants' Point IB set forth in
appellants' original brief because of apparent error in the
Court's conclusion that "it is not the function of this Court
to evaluate the wisdom or practical necessity of legislative
enactments," where, as in the instant appeal, the ordinance in
question was enacted under the guise of being "necessary and
proper."
3.

Appellants respectfully submit that the Court should

reconsider its opinion as to appellants' Point I I set forth in
appellants' original brief due to the apparent conflict and
inconsistencies between said opinion and the Court's previous
opinions.
4.

Appellants respectfully submit that the Court should

reconsider its opinion as to appellants' Point III set forth
in appellants' original brief due to the Court's apparent failure
to address appellants' contention that respondents violated

§ 34-35-6(l)(e) of the Utah Antidiscrimination Act.
5.

Appellants respectfully submit that the Court should i

reconsider its opinion as to appellants' Point I I I set forth
in appellants' original brief because of apparent error in
the Court's conclusion that the ordinance in question does not
"require a massage parlor to refuse service to a customer
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ii

based on his or her gender."
6.

Appellants respectfully submit that the Court should

reconsider its opinion as to appellants' Point V set forth in
appellants' original brief because of apparent error in the
Court's failure to apply the "strict scrutiny-compelling state
interest" test to gender-based classifications as required by
Article IV, Section I of the Utah State Constitution.

7.

Appellants respectfully submit that the Court should

reconsider its opinion as to appellants' Point V set forth in
appellants' original brief due to the apparent conflict and
inconsistencies between the application of the "rational basis"
test in said opinion and the applications in the Court 1 s previous
opinions.

8.

Appellants respectfully submit that the Court should

reconsider its opinion as to appellants' Point V set forth in
appellants' original brief

due to the apparent conflict and

inconsistencies between the interpretation of the Bill of Attainder
Clause of the Utah State Constitution in said opinion and the
interpretations in the Court's previous opinions.

9.

Appellants respectfully submit that the Court should

reconsider its opinion in its entirety due to the apparent conflict
and inconsistencies between the composition of the Court as said
opinion was rendered and the mandate of Article VIII, Section 2
of the Utah State Constitution.

WHEREFORE, appellants petition that a rehearing in the abovecaptioned appeal be granted on the matters set forth above as
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

iii

supported by the brief, next herein, and that the lower court's
Memorandum Decision be reversed, appellants' motion for summary
judgment granted, the massage ordinance in question declared
invalid and unconstitutional, and the enforcement of said
ordinance permanently enjoined.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23rd day of February, 1981.
ROBERT L. STOLEBARGER
HALEY, DAHL & STOLEBARGER, P.C.
250 East Broadway, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
ROBERT D. MAACK
WATKISS & CAMPBELL, P.C.
310 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts set forth herein supplement those previously

lar1t

ic

set forth in appellants' original brief.
On or about the 30th day of January, 1981, the Utah State

lli~

Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 26, amending Title 58 of Utah
Code Annotated (19S3), and, on or about the 18th day of February,

~ ,(,

0~

11

.

1981, this legislation, known as the Massage Practice Act, was
signed into law by the Governor of the State of Utah.

To assist

the Court in appreciating the significance of this comprehensive
legislation as it relates to the instant appeal, a copy of the
newly enacted Massage Practice Act is attached as an appendix
to this brief.
As the Court will find from examining the recent legislation, it is an exhaustive regulatory mechanism for masseuses
and massage establishments.

The new legislation was undoubtedly

that contemplated at the public meeting held prior to the enactment of the Salt Lake County massage ordinance under attack in
the instant appeal.

At that meeting, it was represented to

those in attendance that the massage ordinance was a "difficult"
short term solution, but that comprehensive state legislation
was expected that would treat those in the massage profession
fairly.
In this regard, Hr. Curtis Oberhansley of the Salt Lake
County Attorney's Office stated:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

... even though it is a difficult situation,
those people that are sincere in acting as
legitimate masseuses will have a way in which
to do this. The words granddaddy clause, etc.,
have been mentioned, and there are provisions
in the proposed legislation that is going up
to the State for granddaddy clauses. There is
a school that has now been set up in the State
of Utah for muscle therapists, so we are not
attempting to put anybody out of business who
is a lawful masseuse. We are not attempting
to put anybody out of business who is not
acting as a front for prostitution.
It is our
intent to help these individuals consistent with
the ordinance to become licensed under the State.
As Sou are aware, the County does not have the
ena ling legislation or the power to create a
profession.
It will have to go through the
.
State, and will have to be regulated by the
De artment of Business Re ulation, but this will
e done an it nee s to be done in or er to
control the situation.
That will then become a
self- olicin or anization.
(see, Stipulated
Facts.
(Emphasis a de . )
It is interesting to note that the Salt Lake County
Attorney's Office "sold" the massage ordinance to the Salt
Lake County Commission and those in attendance at the public
meeting by promising that the State would take over the
regulation of

~asseuses

and massage establishments, and, some

two years later, the State has fulfilled the promise.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
RECENT LEGISLATION ENACTED BY THE UTAH
STATE LEGISLATURE AND SIGNED INTO LAW
BY THE GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RENDERS THE MASSAGE ORDINANCE IN QUESTION
AN INVALID EXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER
AND PREEMPTED BY GENEHAL STATE LAW
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A.

CONSIDERATION OF LEGISLATION
ENACTED SUBSEQUENT TO THE
HANDING DOWN OF THE COURT'S
OPINION COMES WITHIN THE
SCOPE OF REVIEW ON REHEARING.

The rule as to what the Supreme Court will consider upon
rehearing was established in the case of In Re MacKnight, 9 P.
299 (Utah 1886), wherein this Court held:
We must be convinced, either that
the court failed to consider some
material point in the case, or
that it erred in its conclusions,
or that some matter has been
discovered which was unknown
when the case was argued.
(at pp. 299-300.) (Emphasis added.)
Clearly, the newly enacted legislation comes within "some
matter ... discovered which was unknown when the case was argued."
It is important to note that by referring this Court to the
recent legislation appellants are not asserting a new contention
(as in Swanson v. Sims, 170 P. 774 (Utah 1918)) nor arguing a
question not assigned as error or previously argued (as in State
v. Kahua, 390 P.2d 737 (Hawaii 1964)).
In the instant appeal, appellants made the contention that
the massage ordinance in question was an unnecessary and improper
exercise of the police power

(~,

Point IB of Appellants' Brief)

and that said ordinance was preempted by general state laws
(~,

Point II of Appellants' Brief).

In referring this Court

to the recent legislation, appellants are merely supporting their
previous contentions.
B.

THE NEWLY ENACTED LEGISLATION
RENDERS THE MASSAGE ORDINANCE
-3-
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AN UNNECESSARY AND IMPROPER
EXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER.
In this Court's opinion in the instant appeal, reference
was made to the case of Jensen v. Salt Lake County Board of
Commissioners, 530 P.2d 3 (Utah 1974).

This Court cited the

language of the Jensen opinion, with approval, as follows:
The regulation of physical therapists
is under the jurisdiction of the
Department of Business Regulations of
the State of Utah pursuant to the
provisions of [ U.C,.A., 1953 ] Section
58-1-5(12) and would not be subject
to regulation by the County.
(Redwood
Gym, et al., v. Salt Lake County
Commission, et al., No. 16833, at
p. 6.)
(Emphasis added.)
This Court went on to state, interpreti:--,6 die rationale in the
Jensen opinion, that:
As the proposed ordinance attempted
to regulate in an area expressly
conunitted by state law to another
agency, it was adjudged an improper
exercise of the police power.
(at p. 6.) (Emphasis added.)
By virtue of the newly enacted Massage Practice Act, the
instant appeal is now governed by the above-quoted Jensen
rationale.

The Massage Practice Act is found within Title 58

of Utah Code Annotated, the same as the Physical Therapists Act
in Jensen, and expressly commits regulation of masseuses and
massage establishments to the Utah State Department of Business
Regulation, just as in the Jensen case.
Given the· recent legislation, Salt Lake County (hereinafter
"the County") is without jurisdiction to invoke the police power:
-4-
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to prohibit activity expressly committed for regulation to a
state agency.

This Court's language in its opinion in the

instant appeal, although now outdated, is illustrative of the
County's jurisdictional limitations:
The power to permit or prohibit
massages by members of the opposite
sex has not been expressly commited
by statute to any existing agency of
government. As such, the provision
does not constitute a jurisdiction
infringement and is not improper on
that basis.
(at p. 7.) (Emphasis
added.)
In sum, as argued in appellants' Point IB and now that the
area of massage regulation has been expressly committed by statute
to the Utah State Department of Business Regulation, the County's
attempt to regulate by ordinance in the same field is unquestionably an invalid exercise of the police power.
C.

THE RECENTLY ENACTED
LEGISLATION PREEMPTS
THE ENTIRE FIELD OF
MASSAGE REGULATION.

This Court's opinion in the instant appeal rejected
appellants' contention that .the massage ordinance was preempted
by general state law because the Court found no conflict between
the two.

In this regard, the Court stated:
... such conflict is not
created by the fact that an
ordinance denounces as unlawful
an act upon which state law is
silent. (at p. 7.) (Emphasis
added.)

With the recent enactment of comprehensive legislation
regulating massueses and massage est.ablishments, it can no longer
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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be said that "state law is silent."

The state has now spoken

and two conflicts are presented, the first a conflict in language
and the second a conflict in jurisdiction.
Many activities are prohibited by the new legislation
(see, Sections 16 and 19 of the Massage Practice Act), but opposi
sex massage is allowed.

Since the massage ordinance under attack

prohibits opposite-sex massage, therein lies the conflicting
language between said ordinance and the new comprehensive legislation.

With respect to conflicting language, this Court set

forth the test in the case of Salt Lake City v. Kusse, 93 P.2d
671 (Utah 1939), wherein the Court stated:
In determining whether an ordinance
is in "conflict" with general state
laws, the test is whether the ordinance permits or licenses that which
the state forbids and prohibits, and
vice versa. Judged by such a test,
an ordinance is in conflict if it
forbids that which the state ~ermits.
(at p. 673.) (Emphasis added.
I

Thus, applying the Kusse test to the instant appeal, it isj
clear that the massage ordinance is invalid as forbiding opposite·
sex massage, which the state permits.
An even more compelling reason for invalidating the massage
ordinance is the jurisdictional conflict between the County's
licensing body and the State's regulatory agency.

This Court

addressed a similar set of circumstances in the case of State v.
Salt Lake City, 445 P.2d 671

(Ut~h

1968), wherein the Court

examined Salt Lake City's attempt to license private clubs when
the State of Utah had a regulatory statute in effect.

-6-

There
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the Court stated:
... the invalidity arises, not
from the conflict of language,
but from the inevitable conflict
o·f jurisdiction which would
result from the dual.re~ulations
covering the same ~roun . Only
by such a broad de inition of
"conflict" is it possible to
confine local legislation to its
proper field of supplementary
regulation.
(at p. 694.)
(Emphasis added.)
And, reference is again made to the language of the Jensen
opinion, wherein this Court stated:
The regulation of physical
therapists is under the
jurisdiction of the Department
of Business Regulation of the
State of Utah pursuant to the
provisions of [U.C.A., 1953J
Section 58-1-5(12) and would
not be subject to regulation
by the county. (at p. 4.)
(Emphasis added.)
In conclusion, as argued in appellants' Point II and now
that the Utah State Legislature has spoken in enacting comprehensive legislation in the field of massage regulation, thereby
affirmatively preempting that field, the massage ordinance in
question is rendered invalid as prohibiting what the State's
regulatory scheme permits and as infringing upon the jurisdiction
of the State's regulatory agency.
POINT II
THERE IS APPARENT ERROR IN THE COURT'S
CONCLUSION THAT "IT IS NOT THE FUNCTION
OF THIS COURT TO EVALUATE THE WISDOH OR
PRACTICAL NECESSITY OF LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS," WHERE, AS IN THE INSTANT
-7-
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APPEAL, THE ORDINANCE IN QUESTION
WAS ENACTED UNDER THE-GUISE OF
BEING "I'iECESSARY AND PROPER."
In the Court's opinion in the instant appeal, the Court
stated that:
It is not the function of this
Court to evaluate the wisdom or
practical necessity of legislative
enactments.
(at p. 5.)
Appellants respectfully submit that the above-quoted
statement of the Court is in error where, as in the instant appea
the Court is requested to rule on an ordinance enacted under the

I

guise of being "necessary and proper."

Appellants concede that ordinarily courts will not determi1

the "propriety, wisdom, necessity or expedience" of legislative
enactments.

(See, Great Salt Lake Authority v. Island Ranching

Co., 414 P. 2d 963, rehearing 421 P. 2d 504 (Utah 1966)).

But, in

the Listant appeal, the massage ordinance in question was attacke,
as be int; unnecessary and improper and, thus, an invalid exercise j
of the police power.
This Court has stated that the powers of a county are limiO
In the case of Salt Lake City v. Kusse, this Court foUJ.1d that a
municipality:
may possess and exercise only
the powers granted in express words
and such as are necessarily or
fairly implied in or incident to,
the powers expressly granted, or
those essential to the declareOobjects and purposes ... not merely
convenient but indispensable.
(at p. 672.) (Emphasis added.)
(see also, Dillon Municip~l Corporations, 5th Ed., p. 448, s237.)
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In the instant appeal, the County has argued that the
massage ordinance in question is "necessary and proper" to
improve the morals of its citizenry.

Appellants concede that

improving morals comes within the "declared objects and purposes"
found at ~17-5-77 of Utah Code Annotated (1953).

However,

appellants insist that, under the holding in Kusse, the County's
ordinance must undergo the Court's scrutiny.

In this regard,

the Court must look to see if the ordinance is "essential" to
improving morals "not merely convenient but indispensable."
Appellants respectfully submit that this Court cannot determine whether the questioned ordinance is essential and indispensable without looking to its wisdom and practical necessity.
In sum, appellants ask this Court to reconsider its opinion
as to appellants Point IB set forth in appellants' original brief
and determine whether the massage ordinance is essential and
indispensable to improving the morals of the citizens of Salt
Lake County.
POINT III
THERE ARE APPARENT CONFLICTS AND
INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN THE COURT'S
OPINION AS TO APPELLANTS' PREEMPTION
ARGUMENT IN THE INSTANT APPEAL AND
THE COURT'S PREVIOUS OPINIONS.
In rejecting appellants' preemption argument

(~,

Point II

of Appellants' Brief), this Court ruled that "the opposite-sex
massage provision is not invalid by reason of preemption by state
18" Footnote 18 then went on to say:
law. ~
We so hold in awareness of the
decision of Layton City v. Speth,
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Utah, 578 P.2d 828 (1978). (Emphasis
added.)
Prior to the Court's opinion in the instant appeal, the
case of Layton City v. Speth was the last word on preemption
from the Utah Supreme Court.

In the Layton City case, this

Court held invalid a city's attempt to regulate the use of illeg<
drugs by copying in its ordinance the language of the State
Controlled Substances Act.

The court ruled that given state

occupation of the subject matter, the municipality, under its
general police power, did not even have the authority to copy
the statute.

In this regard, the Court stated:
The State of Utah has enacted statutes
controlling the sale, gift, or use of
(t)he city
controlled substances
has no power or authority to copy the
statute in its ordinance.
(at p. 829.)
i

In applying the approach taken in Layton City to the massa~
ordinance in the instant appeal, appellants argued that said

!

ordinance was preempted by the comprehensive general state laws !

regulating criminal sexual activity, and that if the County was
without authority to even copy the state prostitution laws, it

!

was surely without authority to enact an ordinance that amended
the state's laws to include an additional classification of sexu~
offense.
The Court in rendering its opinion in the instant appeal
does not discuss, distinguish or overrule the case of Layton C_ill
and yet it appears to adopt the rationale articulated in former
Chief Justice Crockett's dissent in Layton City.

If the Court

wishes to adopt the dissenting opinion in Layton City as its
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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0~ 1

it would seem that the Court would necessarily have to overrule,
or at least distinguish, that case from the instant appeal.
In conclusion, until Layton City is overruled or distinguished, appellants respectfully submit that, under the doctrine
of stare decisis, this Court must determine the preemption issue
presented in the instant appeal under and in accordance with its
previous decision.
POINT IV
THE COURT HAS FAILED TO ADDRESS
APPELLANTS' ARGUMENT THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE VIOLATED ~34-35-6(l)(e)
OF THE UTAH ANTIDISCRIMINATION ACT.
In the Court's opinion in the instant appeal, appellants'
contention that the questioned ordinance is violative of the
Utah Antidiscrimination Act

(~,

Point III of Appellants' Brief)

is disposed of on grounds that appellants failed to establish
that they come within the Act's definition of "employer."
The Court, however, has failed to address appellants'
additional contention that the County Commission had, by virtue of
enacting the massage ordinance, violated ss34-35-6(l)(e), which
states in relevant part, as follows:
(1) It shall be a discriminatory or
unfair employment practice:
(e) for any person ... to compel or
otherwise coerce the doing of an act
defined in this section to be a discriminatory or unfair employment
practice or to obstruct or prevent
any person from complying with the
provisions of this chapter ....
(Emphasis added.)
.
The Act defines "person" at ~34-35-2(2), as follows:
-11-
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(2) The word "person" means one or
more individuals, partnerships,
associations, corporations, legal
representatives, trustees, receivers,
the State of Utah and all political
subdivisions and agencies thereof.
(Emphasis added.)
In sum, appellants respectfully request that this Court
reconsider appellants' Point III set forth in appellants' origino
brief insofar as the Court's opinion did not dispose of the issue
presented therein.
POINT V
THERE IS AN APPARENT ERROR IN THE
COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT THE MASSAGE
ORDINANCE DOES NOT "REQUIRE A
MASSAGE PARLOR TO REFUSE SERVICE
TO A CUSTOMER BASED ON HIS OR HER
GENDER.
II

The Court's opinion in the instant appeal disposed of

i

I

appellants' contention that the questioned ordinance is violativ1
of the Utah Civil Rights Act

(~,

Point III of Appellants 1 Brief:

by concluding that the massage ordinance does not "require a
massage parlor to refuse service to a customer based on his or
her gender." (at p. 10.)
Appellants respectfully submit that the Court is in error
in reaching the above-quoted conclusion and that same is totally!
inconsistent with the following language of the opinion:
All individuals, male or female, are
entitled to services of a licensed
masseur, provided that the masseur
is not a member of the opposite sex.
(at p. 10.) (Emphasis added.)
The Court is stating on the one hand that the massage ordin
ance does not require the refusal of service to a customer basea
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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on his or her sex, and then stating on the other hand that it
does require a masseuse to refuse a customer of the opposite sex.
The only case cited by either appellants or respondents
that is on point is Cianciolo v. City Council of Knoxville,
376 F. Supp. 719 (D.C. Tenn. 1974).

There, the court

examined a massage ordinance similar to that in the instant
appeal under the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, which Act
served as the model for Utah's civil rights statutes.

The

court found that sex was not a bona fide occupational
qualification and further concluded that:
The ordinance . . . fails to recognize
that not all masseuses will abuse a
historically legitimate occupation
when permitted to massage clients of
the opposite sex . . . . The infirmity
is that this presumption is grounded
on an individual's sex. In conclusion,
it would appear that the ordinance does
not comply with the spirit, if not the
letter, of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(at p. 723.) (Emphasis added.)
Respondents attempt to discredit the precedential value
of the Cianciolo case by suggesting that it has been overruled
by a footnote in an Indiana case.

The Cianciolo case, contrary

to respondents' assertions, has not been overruled by any
court.

The Indiana Supreme Court, in City of Indianapolis v.

Wright, 371 N.E.2d 1298, appeal dismissed for want of a
substantial federal question, 439 U.S. 804, 99 S.Ct. 60, 53
L.Ed.2d 97 (1978); merely stated in footnote 1 that Cianciolo
was decided prior to the flood of federal cases finding massage
ordinances constitutional, and, as such, that Cianciolo had
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"apparently" been overruled.

Appellants wish to point out that

the City of Indianapolis case did not present the issue of a
Civil Rights Act violation, and, thus, its footnote can in no
way be considered as reflecting on that aspect of the Cianciolo
case.

Furthermore, counsel for appellants have not found a sing]

case that has reached either the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
or the United States Supreme Court that has addressed the issue
presented in Cianciolo, and these two courts are the only courts
with the authority to overrule Cianciola.

Thus, the holding

reached by the court in Cianciolo is still the law with respect
to massage ordinances in violation of the Civil Rights Act and
still of precedential value to this Court in deciding the same
issue.
In sum, appellants respectfully submit that the Court is in:
error when it concludes that the sex of the customer is not a
determining factor in the rendering of services by a masseuse
and that said conclusion is inconsistent with the Cianciolo case

I
I

and with the Court's own language indicating that the rendering,
services by a masseuse is indeed dependent on the sex of his or
her customers.

Appellants respectfully request that the Court

reconsider Point III of appellants' original brief in light of
the foregoing inconsistencies.
POINT VI
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY
THE STRICT SCRUTINY-COMPELLING STATE
INTEREST TEST.
In the Court's opinion in the instant appeal, the Court
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elected not to apply the "strict scrutiny-compelling state" interest
test (see, Point V of Appellants' Brief) by finding that the
massage ordinance in question did not create a gender-based
classification.

The Court specifically withheld a ruling as to

whether a gender-based classification is inherently suspect under
Utah law and, thus, whether the strict scrutiny-compelling state
interest test should be applied.
As stated more fully above at Point V herein, appellants
respectfully submit that the Court is in error when it concludes
that the massage ordinance does not create a gender-based classification.
For the reasons set forth in Point V above, in addition to
those at Point V of appellants' brief, appellants respectfully
submit that the Court should decide if a gender-based classification is inherently suspect under Utah law and, having so decided,
that the Court should apply the strict scrutiny-compelling state
interest test to the gender-based classification in the instant
appeal.
POINT VII
THERE ARE APPARENT CONFLICTS AND
INCONSISTENCIES IN THE APPLICATION
OF THE RATIONAL BASIS TEST IN THE
COURT'S OPINION IN THE INSTANT
APPEAL AND THE APPLICATIONS IN THE
COURT'S PREVIOUS OPINIONS.
In its opinion in the instant appeal, the Court applied the
"rational basis" test to appellants' contentions that the massage
ordinance is unconstitutional

(~,

-15-

Point V of Appellants' Brief).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Appellants respectfully submit that the application of the
rational basis test in the instant appeal is in conflict with
the applications of said test in the Court's previous opinions.
In the Jensen case, for example, this Court stated:
At the trial in the court below a
county commissioner and a member
of the county sheriff's office
testified that prostitution was the
major concern in the adoption of the
ordinance in question.
It is the
county's contention that it is a
valid exercise of police power to
regulate massage establishments and
to control prostitution. We are
of the opinion that the county does
have the power to deal with those
matters directly. However, the
ordinance under consideration does
neither, but rather it attempts to
set standards and qualifications of
those· persons who intend to engage
in a legitimate occupation or trade.
(at p. 4.) (Emphasis added.)
The Court in Jensen, as the above-quoted language indicates,
concluded that the County's massage parlor licensing ordinance
was an attempt to indirectly control prostitution and, thus, said;
ordinance was not rationally related to the stated purpose, and
further concluded that if the County wanted to control prostitu·
tion it had the power to do so, but that it must exercise that
power "directly."
Appellants respectfully submit that the Court should apply
the rational basis test in the instant appeal in the manner in
which it was applied in Jensen.

That is to say, that this

Co~t

should examine the massage ordinance in question to see if it
attempts to do indirectly what could be done directly, and,
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therefore, whether it is rationally related to its objective.

An additional example of the conflict and inconsistencies
between the application of the rational basis test in the instant
appeal and the applications of said test in prior decisions can
be found in Hart Health Studio v. Salt Lake County, 577 P.2d 116
(Utah 1978).

In Hart Health Studio, this Court was presented with

a massage ordinance somewhat similar to that in the instant appeal
which required the posting of a performance bond before a masseuse could be permitted to massage a customer of the opposite sex.
There, the Court was informed that the purpose for such a performance bond was to discourage "pleasure-type" massages.

The Court,

applying the rational basis test, found no reasonable basis for
such a performance bond.
Appellants respectfully submit that if it was unreasonabie
to require a masseuse to post a performance bond before he could
render services to a customer of the opposite sex, it is, under
the same rationale, unreasonable to prohibit a masseur from
massaging members of the opposite sex entirely.

If, as this

Court determined in Hart Health Studio, requiring a performance
bond had no rational relationship to discouraging "pleasure-type"
massages, then surely the massage ordinance in question, which
blanketly prohibits opposite-sex massage, has no rational relationship to the objective of curbing prostitution.
In sum, appellants respectfully submit that the rational
basis test be applied to the instant appeal in a manner consistent
with its application in this Court's previous opinions.

-17-
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POINT VIII
THERE ARE APPARENT CONFLICTS AND
INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN THE COURT'S
INTERPRETATION OF THE BILL OF
ATTAINDER CLAUSE OF THE UTAH STATE
CONSTITUTION IN THE INSTANT APPEAL
AND THE COURT'S INTERPRETATIONS IN
PREVIOUS OPINIONS.
In this Court's opinion in the instant appeal, appellants'
contention that the massage ordinance in question is a bill of
attainder under Article I, Section 18 of the Utah State Constitu·
tion (see, Point V of Appellants' Brief) is disposed of summarily
Appellants respectfully submit that in summarily disposing
l

with the bill of attainder issue presented, the Court created
several inconsistencies between its interpretation of the Bill
of Attainder Clause in the instant appeal and its interpretation
in Hart Health Studio.
The Court, in the instant appeal, found the massage ordinance in question to bear none of the characteristics of a bill of
attainder.

In this regard, the Court stated:
A bill of attainder is one which
imposes guilt, and inflicts punishment, upon an identifiable
individual or group without judicial process. (citations omitted.)
The enactment here under consideration bears none of these characteristics. (at p. 12.)

In Hart Heal th Studio, the Court was presented with an earl!
version of the County massage ordinance, which provided in part
for an annual license fee of $5,000.00 for any massage parlor
employing a masseur whose massage parlor license had been revoked

-18-
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within the past 12 months.

This Court, in examining the consti-

tutionality of this provision, stated:
We also believe this section of the
ordinance is somewhat like the old
bills of pains and penalties (see,
Article I, Section 18, Utah Constitution). The ordinance clearly
penalizes the masseur and his
employer without a trial or conviction, and thus is clearly invalid
and unenforceable under the constitutional provisions cited.
(at p. 118.) (Emphasis added.)
The instant appeal presents a type of penalty to masseuses
without trial or conviction similar to that in Hart Health Studio.
Only in the instant appeal, the punishment is not an excessive
license fee it is being driven out of business.
The sanction of forfeiture of a job or business enterprise
has long been deemed to be punishment within the contemplation of
the Bill of Attainder Clause.

(See, Nixon v. Administration of

General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977), at p. 469; see also,
United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437).
That a group need not be small to be encompassed within
the Bill of Attainder Clause is well accepted.

(See, United

States v. Brown; Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control
Board, 367 U.S. 1).
Appellants submit that the attainder presented in Hart Health
Studio was the County's deciding for itself that a group of
masseuses who had worked for a massage establishment who's license.
had been revoked should be punished by requiring license fees so
high that no one would hire them.

-19-

In the instant appeal, the
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size of the group and the degree of punishment have been increas
so that, under the new ordinance, the County has decided for
itself that all masseuses should be punished by limiting their
clientele to the same sex, in effect, driving them out of busine 1
Under the approach taken in Hart Health Studio, both ordinances
inflict punishment to ascertainable groups without trial or
conviction, and both constitute violations of the Bill of

Atta~-

der Clause.
In conclusion, appellants respectfully submit that this
Court should interpret the Bill of Attainder Clause in the instan
l

appeal in a manner consistent with its interpretation in Hart
Health Studio.
POINT IX
THE COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER ITS
OPINION IN ITS ENTIRETY DUE TO
THE APPARENT CONFLICT AND INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN THE COMPOSITION OF THE COURT AS SAID
OPINION WAS RENDERED AND THE
.MANDATE OF ARTICLE VIII,
SECTION 2 OF THE UTAH STATE
CONSTITUTION.
The opinion handed down by the Court in the instant appeal
indicated that it was authored by Justice Hall and concurred in
by Justice Stewart and District Judge Conder, and further indicated that then-Chief Justice Crockett, Justice Wilkins and
now-Chief Justice Maughan did not participate.
Appellants submit that the above composition of the Supreme
Court is improper as being in conflict with the mandate of
Article VIII, Section 2 of the Utah State Constitution.
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In thls

regard, Article VIII, Section 2 states in relevant part, as
follows:
The Supreme Court shall consist of
five jud~es, which number may be
increase or decreased by the
legislature, but no alteration or
increase shall have the effect of
removing a judge from office ....
If a justice of the Supreme Court
shall be disqualified from sitting
in a cause before said court, the
remaining judges shall call a ~
district judge to sit with them
on the hearing of such a cause ....
(Emphasis added.)
As pointed out in Shippers Best Exp., Inc. v. Newsom, 579
P.2d 1316 (Utah 1978), by then-Justice Maughan in his well
supported dissent:
In interpreting the Constitution
of Utah, reference must always
be made to the fundamental guide
set forth in Article I, Section
26: "The provisions of this
Constitution are mandatory and
prohibitory, unless by express
words they are declared to be
otherwise." (at p. 1319.)
(Emphasis is Justice Maughan's.)
In the instant appeal, the Supreme Court, contrary to
Article VIII, Section 2, was composed of only three judges, not -the required five.

Appellants realize that Justice Wilkins and

then-Chief Justice Crockett resigned from the Court and that
now-Chief Justice Maughan was ill during the pendency of this
appeal.

Nevertheless, appellants respectfully submit that the

remaining judges were mandated to call up three district judges
to sit with them in the place of their disqualified brethren.
-21-·
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With respect to what constitutes disqualification within
the meaning of Article VIII, Section 2, this Court is referred
to its earlier decision in In Re Thompson's Estate, 269 P. 103
(Utah _ _ ).

There this Court ruled that the term "disqualified'

is to be used in its rational and ordinary sense to include
illness, physical disability or any other condition of incapacit1
Thus, resignation and illness clearly come within the meaning of
disqualified as it was used in Article VIII, Section 2.
As then-Justice Maughan further pointed out in his dissent
in Shippers :
... the procedure to substitute
for a disqualified justice in
Sec. 2, Art. VIII is exclusive;
for all instances in which a
justice aoes not sit on a particular case.
(at p. 1320.)
(Emphasis added.)
Thus, for the foregoing reasons, appellants respectfully
submit that this Court should reconsider its opinion in the
instant appeal with five judges participating, as contemplated
in and mandated by Article VIII, Section 2 of the Utah State
Constitution.

-22-
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CONCLUSION
Appellants respectfully request that a rehearing in
the above-captioned appeal be granted on the matters set
forth in Points I through IX hereinabove and that the lower
court's Memorandum Decision be reversed, appellants' motion
for summary judgment granted, the massage ordinance
declared invalid and unconstitutional, and the enforcement
of said ordinance permanently enjoined.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23rd day of February, 1981.
ROBERT L. STOLEBARGER
HALEY, DAHL & STOLEBARGER, P.C.
250 East Broadway, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
ROBERT D.
WATKISS &
310 South
Salt Lake

MAACK
CAMPBELL, P.C.
Main Street
City, Utah 84101
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Be it enacted bv the Legislature of the State of Utah:
Section

19
20

SETTING,

SECTION 58-1-5, UT.?..H CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS

16

18

THE

AND

1.

This act shall be known and may be cited as

the "Massage Practice Act."

21

Section 2.

22

(1)

As used in this act:

"Massage" means the cractice of a orofession whereby

23

the ooerator scientifically acolies his hands

24

using

25

(stroking),

friction

26

tacotement

(percussion),

variations

27

(2)

28

those courses

29

physiology

30

s~udv

31

and

32

massaqe,

33

aoparatus,

of

the

following

(rubbing),

to

the

procedures:
oetrissage

patron,

ef!leurage
(kneading),

and vibration (shaking or trembling).

"Massage technician" means a oet"son who has comoleted

as

of

study

in

~he

crinciples

of

anatomy

and

are generally included in the regular course of

provided by a recognized and acproved school

of

massaae

who oractices or administers any of the technioues of body
either by hands or with
for

the

ouroose

of

a

mechanical
body

or

electrical

massaging,

reducina or

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

S. B. No. 26

2

contouring, which may include the use of oil rubs, heat

3

salt

4

baths.

glows,

"Massage

(3)

5

hot and cold oacks,

tub,

establishment"
one

6

el ace of business in which

7

treatment

8

section 1 are administered or used.

identified

"Board"

9

{4)

10

this chapter.

more

or

subsections

·in

steam or cabinet

means any establishment or
of

the
and

Pl

methods
of

{2)

of
this

the Utah board of massage created in

means

There is created,

Section 3.

11

shower,

lames,

subject to the reauirements

12

of chapter l of title

13

consist

14

terms of four years and until their resoective successors

15

been

16

board,

two of whom shall be aooointed to serve

17

1983,

and three of whom shall be apoointed to serve until July

18

1,

of

five

aopointed

members,

board

of

massage

which

shall

all of whom shall be apoointed for
have

and aualified, except the members of the first
until

July

l,

1985.

Section

19

a

58,

4.

The members of the board shall,

20

aooointed,

21

from their number a chairman.

as soon as

and annually thereafter in the month of June,

elect

rt shall be unlawful for anv oerson to engage

Section 5.
23

in the practice of, or attemot to practice massagei

24

massage

25

demonstration; or to conduct or teach massage without a license

26

issued

27

emoloved by an educational

28

orimarily

29

!itness courses to the oublic, bv a orivate

30

or

31

£._~

32

accrediting

33

chaoter.

by

technician

under

the

engaged

for

a

fee,

orovisions

in

of

an educationa!_institution

education,

s~ate

body

decartment
shall

for a gratuity, or in a free

this

institution

providing

to act as a

chacter.
or

physical

Any oerson

business

that

conditioning
secondary

regulated_~Y

is
and

school,

the state board

o~f~~e~d~u~c:::..=.a~t~1~o~n~,'--__;.o~r~~a~__;.r~e~g~i-o_n_a~l

be exempt from

t~e

o~ovisions

of this
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AMENDED ON THIRD READING

1

S. B. No. 26

2

Section

Nothing

6.

herein

3

authorizing any person licensed

4

engage

5

the laws of this state:
Doctors

7.

be

-~~~e

a

in any manner in the practice of

Section

6

as

shall

construed

as

technician

to

as defined in

mcdi~ine

of medicine;

'

's. 'physical

R.·N.· 1 a,· L.P.N.

7

therapists, osteopaths and ·chlropracto·rs· 'licensed· ·i'n this ·state, f-OSPlTAL

8

STAFF r-EMBERS and school athletic trainers shall be exempt from the provisions of

9

this chapter.
Section

10
11

Any person who furnishes to the department

8.

satisfactory oroof that he or she is 18 years of age or

12 [a--hlsA---s•Ao<>lr--9-!aa.iu&tre---o-!'--~i"cl"&l:-el'\-t-,J

and

of

good moral

13

character and temperate habits, and makes oath that he

14

has

15

!~lony,

17

.f.!:~99ntials issu~.E-~-

not

olderL

or

she

been convicted of any offense that would constitute a
either in this state or

18 · J\merican

Massa~

any

schoo~

and

other

state

of..~..§.~-~

or

aooroved

Thera.p~seociat~2l!.-9.r

Jjk~~i tute..t-F~resenting

20

[ ~.~E~~~· le.:_s_:!han*) ~:r

21

reasonable demonstrative, oral and written examination,

22

conducted by and under the supervision and direction

23 of the board, in the art

study ao de t.ar•mined bl( the boa rod

to 1. 000

of

the

by

its _successor or

19

UI)

country

h(')llr!=l

body

;inn

IJhf"I

r;\i:;qpq

by hand,

massaqe

;:i

.

or

24

w~th any

25

therapy)

26

contouring, and in the use of oil rubs, salt glow, hot and cold

27

packs,

28

E_ays the fees speci:fied

29'

accompany

30

to be licensed

31

techn:.=i:...;;c:...;;i;.;;a;.;;n;;..;.;____,M..;;..i"'"n-.-.irn.um__E!!Sill-~ments

mechanical or electrical
for

tub,

the

ourpose

steam,

shower,
in

of

aoparatus
body

(excluding

massa9_i_ry_q_,

fever

reducing

or

heat lamps ond. similar bath, and
this

chaoter,

which

fees

shall

the application to the dcoartment, shall be entitled
and

to

be

issued

a
for

li_c~~

a_

as

a

massage

license shall be '!

32 : fl_enernl average i_n...i!,!,_e examination of 75% in each subject.

33 '

Any

person

who has enqa9etj in t~actice of massage in

34

the State of Utah for five years before July l, 1981, and meets

35

nll

age

and moral_~uirernenta shal.l on.l:_y_pe re~red~..E.!~
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· 2· the examination specified in

this

in

section,

to

order

be

3

licensed[**i * provided*the*person*takes*the*examination*before*July

4

l, "1981. *After

~une

* 30, * 1981,

.

I

5

license.d * shall *be * requir.ed

6

examination '*recruirements

7

reauirements. **] .:.

e
9

~n

*all* persons* seeking* to* be

* to

* satisfy* the "tlducational "and

*addition* to* the* nge *and* moral

The fee to be paid by an aoplicant to determine his or her
fitness to receive a license to practice as a licensed

10

technician

11

di rector.

12

The

shall

board

not

be

massa~e

more than $75, as determined by the

shall hold examinations, oral, written, ·and by

13

way of demonstrations, at least annually and from time to

14

at

15

the director, may desicmate.

such

place

or olacas as the board, under the direction of

Section 9.

16

Any apolicant failing to pass the examination

17

orovided for in section 8 shall be entitled, after six

18

to

19

Should the a22licant fail to 12ass the

20

time,

21

the expiration of one year.

a

22

director

Section

months,

u:eon 12aY!!!ent Of an additional fee of $10.

reexamination

the

time

may refuse a

Any

10.

examination

subse~ent

the

second

aeolication until

person who has been duly licensed in

23

another state to practice massage which state has and maintains

24

a

25

maintained in

26

continuously

27

immediatel:z: before filing his or her aE12lication to Eractice in

28

this

29

certificate fr.om the examining board of the state in

30

or

31

licensure and being a person of ..s22SL moral

32

professional

33

granted a license to

34

required

standard of practice which is substantially the same as that

state

she

is

to

this

state,

enszaged

and

who

licens~d,

in

and
au ch

submits

who

has

and

lawfully

12ractice for two :tears or more

to

the

certify~9

attainments,

been

board

the

a duly attested
which

he

fact of his 2r her
character

and

of

may upon paying the required fee be

practice

in

this

state

without

being

take an examination; except that no license shall
-4-
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2

be issued to ·any such aoolicant unless the state

3

which

4

orivileae recicrocally to cersons holding

S

state.

6

agreements

7

substantially the same as those herein orovided.

issued

the

territory

his or her license extends the same
licenses

from

this

The board shall have the power to enter into recicrocal
states

other-

with

Section 11.

8

oerson

or

whose

requirements

are

An apolicant may uocn paving a fee of not to

9

exceed $50, as determined by the director, take the examination

10

on anatomy, physiology and related subjects given by the board,

11

and,

12

deoartment

an

13

permitting

that

14

technician

for

15

oeriod the aporentice

16

orovided in section 8.

on

passing

the

examination

shall

apprenticeship
person

to

be

registration

work

under

a

a oeriod of one vear only.
may

make

issued

by

the

certificate,

licensed

massage

After the one-year

reouest

for

examination

as

17

Section 12.

18

members has reason to

19

health

20

the health of those who seek relief from him or her,

21

deoartment

22

ohvsical examination by a competent medical

23

by

24

examination.

25

aoolicant's

26

or endanger the health of those who seek

27

'_n_e_r~1~_t_h~e~_d_e~o_a~r_t_m_e_n_t~~m_a~y..___d_;,.e_n~y~-t~~-e~a~p~p__,_l_i_c_a_t_i_o_n~_f_o_r~a~_l_i_c_e_n_s~e

28

until the

29

2hysically and mentally dompetent to cractice ma~sage.

30
J:

of

the

any

or

the

ohysical

or

mental

then

the

The
If

department

shall

medical

examiner

the

examiner

cay

the

selected

cost of the

confirms

the

that

oh·1s1cal or mental health is such as to jeooardize

13.

furnishes

Each

relief

satisfactory

licensed

massaqe

l '! d l ~ o 1 a y at the o l ace o f hi s o r

the
33

that

the board shall require the aoolicant to have a

applicant

-: u o u s

believe

applicant is such as to jeaoardize or endanger

board.

?_ec'::1on
~..£!) ~p i

If the deoartment or a majority of the board

license

issued him or

he~.

from

croof

him

of

or

being

technician shall
he r

~ithin

p r act i c e

of

30 davs after

issuance of the license.
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Section

2

All licenses issued by the department shall

14.

3

expire on the first day of January of the year next

4

the

5

payment of a fee to be fixed annually by the department.

issuance

Section

6

A

thereof.

license

may

be

succeeding

renewed upon the

Attendance at such postgraduate course as

15.

7

may be prescribed by the board, at least two days each year, is

8

a

9

may waive the

10

further

requirement

for renewal of the license.

continuing

education

reouirement

in

The board
case

of

certified illness or undue hardship.

16.

Section

11

It

operate or conduct

13

licensed, or does not conform to the sanitary regulations which

14

may be adopted by the department, or to employ any person as an

15

operator

16

issued under the provisions of this chapter.

17

It

massage

shall

be

massage

unlawful for any person to

12

or

any

be

shall

establishment

technician

unlawful

for

who

which

is

not

does not hold a license

any massage establishment to

18

disolay signs indicating massage or to advertise massage unless

19

all

20

licensed under this chapter.

21

designated

22

abbreviation

23

technician."

24

Section

of

the

massage

massage

technicians

the

license

establishment
holders

shall

are
be

technicians and shall not use any title or
without

thereof

Any

17.

All

in

the

designation

"massage

persQJl desiring to operate a'massage

25

establishment whera· massage is practiced shall make application

26

to

27

licenses shall expire on January 1 o! each year

28

renewed

29

license shall be fixed annually by the department and shall not

30

exceed the eum of $10 and shall be paid to the department.

31

the

department

annually.

Section

18.

for

The

a massage establishment license.

fee

for

the

massage

and

shall

All
be

establishment

It shall be the duty of the tooal board of heaith

32

at least annually and from time to time to examine and inspect or cause

33

to

34

state_:_

35

!!nter and

be examined and inspected all massage establishments in the
The toaai

~

of heaith and it1s aqents and employees rney
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2

insnect

3

establis~ment

4

board of hea1th shaZZ revort in[raations to the ZoaaZ Zaw enforcement

any

mnnsaqe

establishment

any

time

when

the

is open for the transaction of business. The Zooa?

££'!.2~ THE EOARD MAY a-tARGg
Sa INSPECTION PROVIDED.

5
6

at

A REASONABLE FEE NOT TO EXCEED ACTUAL COST FOR THE

·

Section_--'1_9_._ _ _T_h_e__l_i_cense of a rnassaqe technician or a

7

massage establishment may be

revoke~.

~usoended__o_r~_c_a_n_c_e_l_e_d

a upon any one or more of the following grounds·
9

10

deceit in the admission to the oractice of massage;

11

The licensee has been convicted during the past five

i2)

12

Y.!?.ars of a

13

1

construed

felony.

to

be

The

the

conviction

conviction

a__f_e_l_o_n_y~_s_h_a_l_l__b_e_

of

of

any

14 . committed within the State of Utah would
15

offense

which
a

constitute

if

felony

under the laws thereof;

16

l

The

(3)

17 ' under a false or
18

licensee

assumed

is engaaed in the practice of massage

or

name

is

impersonating

another

practitioner of a like or different name;

19'
20·

(4)

The

licensee

is

addicted

dependent upon the use of intoxicating

to

osychologicallv

or

narcotics

liquors,

or

21:i stimulants to such an extent as to incapacitate him or her from
22 I
~he performance of his or her professional duties;
1

23 ;

21!,

I

ill

The

physical or mental condition of the licensee is

determined by a comoetent medical examiner to

be

such

as

to

25'

jeopardize or endanger the health of those who seek relief from

26l

the registrant.

27

demand

i
I

28

an

The department or majority of

examination

board

at

the

deoartment's

expense.

• i

Failure

30

immediate grounds for suspension of the licensee's licensei

"9

31

(6}

to

submit

The

to

such

an

examination s)iall const:.tute

licensee is guilty of willful negligence in the

32

practice of massage or has been guilty of

33

or

34

or her establishment;

permitting

may

of the licensee by a comoetent medical

examiner selected by the board

I

the

employing,

allowing

any unlicensed person to perform massage in his
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(7)

2

Th.e

licensee

is

g-u.ilty

3

misleading or decective advertising.

4

medicines or drugs; or

5

( 8}

6

chaoter.

7

The

licensee

has

of
or he

violated

fraudulent,

untrue,
or

anv

she

crescribes

provision of this

The,oroceedings for cancellation,

Section 20.

revocation

8

or suspension of a license may be initiated when the deoartment

9

or

the

board

has

in.formation

that any person may have been

10

guilty of any misconduct as provided in section 19 or is guilty

11

of

12

conduct.

gross

incompetence

Section

13

or

Upon

21.

unprofessional

written

or

dishonorable

aoolication

establishing

14

compliance with existing licensing requirements and for reasons

15

the deoartment deems sufficient, the deoartment,

16

shown, may, under such conditions as it mav

17

or

18

susoended or revoked and, uoon susoension

19

department in its order may provide for automatic reinstatement

20

thereof after a fixed oeriod of time as provided in the

reissue

21

a

Section

license

to

any

for good cause

impose,

reinstate

person whose license has been
of

a

license,

the

order.

Any person violating the orovisions of this

22.

22

chacter mav be enjoined from further violations in the district

23

court

24

cause shown, upon the initiative of the department.

25

of

comcetent

Sect:on 23.

jurisdiction,

last amended by Chapter 5,

27

read:
58-1-5.

to Utah law,

Laws of Utah

The functions of the

1990,

depar~ment

29

shall be exercised by the director of

30

supervision

31

regulation and, when so provided, with

32

assistance

of

33

professions.

trades and occupations as follows:

of

for

Section 58-1-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as

26

28

pursuant

the

commission

representative

is

amended

to

of registration

registration

under

the

of the department of business
the

collaboration

committees

of

the

and

several
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2
3

For

( l)

a

accountants,

committee

of

three competent

public accountants.
(2)

4

5

26

For architects, a committee of five architects,

known as the "Architectural Examining Board."
(3)

6

For

barbers, a committee of three persons, citizens

7

of the United States who have practiced barbering for at

8

five years.

9

(4)

10

(5)

11

chiropractors;

12

palpating

13

least

for podiatry, a committee of three podiatrists.
For

chiropractors,
chiropractic

is

a

committee

defined

as

of

the

three

science

of

and adjusting the articulation of the spinal column.
for

( 6)

dentists,

a

committee of five persons; but no

14

member of such committee shall be a member of

15

any

16

or have a financial interest in any such college.

17

to be

the

faculty

of

dental college or dental department of any medical college

(7)

for

persons

in

the practice of funeral service, a

18

committee of three persons licensed for the practice of funeral

19

service

20

combination thereof, each of whom has had

21

years'

22

human bodies, and in the

23

preceding

24

the "State Soard of funeral Service."

25
26

27

or

as

funeral

experience

their

(8)

For

in

directors

or

embalmers
a

or

minimum

for
of

a

five

the preparation and disposition of dead
practice

appointment.

of

embalming,

i~mediately

The committee shall be known as

cosmetologists

and

electrologists, a board of

five licensed cosmetologists.
(9)

For

persons

28

license to

29

pursuant

30

through 58-12-39,

Jl

pursuant

J2

!3 <) ..:.i i.- rJ . "

JJ

concurrence

practice
to

the

who apply for,

medicine

and

or have been granted,

surgery

Utah Medical Practice Act,
a

committee

to that act,

of

s~ven

at

all

branches

sections 58-12-26

physicians

licensed

to be lmown as the "Physicians Licensing

I' Io t w l th s t n n rl i n g the rn o v 1 z l on s a f

of

in

a

least

five

:.:, e c t i o n S 8 - 1 - l ..J: ,

the

ml;!mber:::. of the board shall be
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2

required for the taking of any action under

3

Practice Act.

4

the

Utah

Medical

For practitioners in th~.treatment of human ailments

(10)

accordan~e

S

in

6

colleg~,

7

registr~tion,

8

designated

9

practice of obstetrics with the use of drugs or

or

with

the

tenets

institution,
of

in

whicr

his

a

recognized
the

professional
by

applicant

applic~tion

for

e~cept

is

department

of

graduate

as

a

a license,

including the
medicine,

but.

without

11

committee of five members to be

12

Notwithstanding

13

shall be

14

branches,

15

licensed to

16

the use of drugs or medicine and without operative surgery, one

17

member shall be·a citizen who is not licensed

18

art

19

Utah medical school.

the

licens~d

and

surgery,

the

schoolr

10

20

operative

of

to

pr~ctice

designated

practice
shall

by

the

a

director.

section 58-1-6, one member

provisions of

~embers

two

operative minor surgery,

medicine

and

surgery

in

all

be practitioners of naturopathy

the treatment of

human

ailments

in

any

without

healing

one member shall be on the staff of the university of

( 11)

for

practitioners

of

naturopathy,

a committee of

21

three members, each of whom shall be a graduate of a school

of

22

nat'....!ropathy

of

23

registration.
( 12)

.of

For

standing

recognized

by

the

department

practitioners of physical therapy,

a committee
pr~ctitioner

25

of three members, each of whom shall be a licensed

26

of physical therapy in this state and a graduate of an

27

school of physical therapy.

28

(13)

For osteopathic physicians and surgeons,

of three members

30

chartered college of osteopathy of recognized standing.

32

33
34

(14)

For

of

whom

optometrists,

shall

a

be

a

a committee

29

31

each

comrnitt:ee

ap~roved

graduate

of three

of

a

lice~sed

optometrists.

(15)

For pharmaci5ts,

a committee of five pharmacists to

be designated as Utah state board of pharmacy.

-10-
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J

~eterinarians

4

university

5

registration.

6

(17)

7

(18)

veterinaries,

For

( 16)

2

committee

a

of

three

each of whom shall be a graduate of a college
standing

of

by

recognized

the

or

department

of

For plumbers, a committee of five persons.
For

sanitarians, a committee of five persons, each

8

of whom shall have had a minimum of five years' experience as a

9

sanitarian.
For

(19)

10

persons

engaged

in

conducting, operating or

11

maintaining in any home,

12

business

13

maintenance of the needy, the care of the aged or

14

two

15

certified operators, each of whom shall have had a

16

five years' experience as a home operator.

or

residence or domiciliary facility

of a nursing home, maternity home,

more

17

(20)

18

psychologists.

19

( 21)

nonrelated

psychologists,

For

a

individuals,

For landscape architects,

(3)

the refuge care or
infirm,

committee

a landscape architectural

21

whom,

22

practitioner of landscape architecture in all branche?

23

in

24

Landscape architecture.

25
26

this

state

For

( 22)

and

the

a

date

landscape

architects,

of this act,

graduate

of

of

five

of

examining board of three
effective

five

minimum

20

after

for

of

committee

a

the

a

each

of

shall be a licensed

recognized

practice of social work,

certified social workers, one social service

thereof
school of

a board of three
worker,

and

one

27- 3oc1al service aide.
28

29

JO
31
32

33

For

( 23)

marriage and family counselors,

a

commi~tee

of

five persons.
For

( 2-1-)

known as the
( 25)

persons.

electricians,

sta~e

For

a

board of five persons,

to be

electrical board.

electronic repair dealers,

Three members of the committee

a committee of five

shall

be

electronic
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l

s.

2

service

3

t~e

B. No. 26
The

dealers.

remaining members shall be chosen from

general public.

4

(26)

For

recreational

therapists,

a

committee of one

5

therapeutic recreation specialist, one

6

worker,

7

who shall be either an,instructor in therapeutic recreation

8

an

9

recreation or a director of a clinical treatment center.

one

therapeutic recreation technician;

accredited

10

school

Fo~

(27)

therapeutic

t~e

of

providing

pr~ctice

program

and one member

in

at

therapeutic

of speech pathology and audiology,

11

a committee

12

notwithstanding

13

licensed, ex'cept for those initially appointed under this

14

and shall be engaged in providing speech pathology or audiology

15

services to the

16

committee

17

professional interest and activity, one shall be

18

school

speech

19

or audiology services,

20

pathology

21

schools, one shall be from a

provisions

public

shall

clinic

22- college

five

a

recreation

be

as
in

pathologists

of

a

58-1-6,

major
private

or

all of whom shall be

interest.
practice

one

shall

be

a

of

a

the

primary

from

a

non-

of

speech

or audiology services in the elementary or secondary

or

university

speech

training

pathology

program,

and

audiology

and one shall be a

24

At

25

who represent speech pathology or more than three

26

represent audiology.

28

as

provider

prov:der of speech pathology or audiology

27

One

act,

setting which provides ongoing speech pathology

23

no

audiologists,

services

at

large.

time shall the board consist of more than three members

(28)

members

who

cor occupational therapists and occupational therapy

assistants a board of five occupational therapists.

29

(29)

For hearing aid dealers,

a committee of five persons

JO

consisting of a physician specializing in diseases of the

31

two

32

of the national hearing aid society or who are approved by

33

Utah

ear,

licensed hearing 3id specialists who are certified members

hea:-ing

aid

society,

two ·persons,

the

eu:her utilizing a

-12-
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1

S. B. No. 26

2

hearinq aid o_;-,, a parent or guardian

3

hearing aid.

4

. (30)

5
6

7

8

For

the

practice

of

of

a

massage,

child

a

utilizing

a

board

licensed massage technicians[**~**] and one lay membe~.

Seation 24.

Thia aa"t ahali exvire on July 1 1 1987, in aooordance

with the provisions of Chapter 55 1 of Title 63.
Section' [**24**] 25. This act shall take effect upon approval.

9
10

-13-
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